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Abstract 
 
In the last two years, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine has been analysed by legal experts in relation 
to the possible secession of the eastern territories and its legal and political consequences. Less 
attention has been given to a peaceful settlement of the dispute through the deployment of UN 
peacekeeping forces. The Ôpeacekeeping solutionÕ is quite appealing, but it is not straightforward, 
due to the Russian opposition in the Security Council. In order to adopt it, the international 
community needs to bypass the Security CouncilÕs deadlock using an alternative process. This 
article discusses the possibility to have a peacekeeping operation in Eastern Ukraine established by 
the UN General Assembly. Traditionally, the UN Security Council is considered the organ 
competent for the deployment of peacekeeping operations. Taking a differentiated approach, and 
recalling the ÔUniting for PeaceÕ Resolution, the author argues that there can be a role of the 
General Assembly on the matter. The analysis focuses on two points: (i) the legitimacy of a 
Ukrainian request, giving attention to the factual situation in Eastern Ukraine and to the legal 
conditions under which a UN peacekeeping mission can lawfully operate; and (ii) the competence 
of the UN General Assembly in authorizing peacekeeping operations in Eastern Ukraine, 
considering both its traditional function and the legal basis that supports a different interpretation of 
its role in maintaining international peace and security. 
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1. Introduction 
Since its beginning, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine1 has raised legal issues that get to the 
core of International Law and international legal theory.2 In particular, the debate among 
legal experts has focused on the question of secession, the right to self-determination of 
people, and the respect of the territorial integrity of States.3 The main concern of the 
scholarship has been to identify the political and legal consequences of a secession of 
UkraineÕs eastern territories, and the possible violations of International Law that would 
occur in such a situation.4 A less investigated aspect of the conflict is the chance to find a 
legal solution to the hostilities, seeking to cease violence among the parties, and to settle 
the dispute under the aegis of the UN. This goal may be achieved with the deployment of 
UN peacekeeping forces. 
 The idea of a peacekeeping operation in Eastern Ukraine is advanced following the 
requests sent to the UN by the Ukrainian Government in the last two years. In particular, on 
4 January 2016, the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN has called for a UN 
peacekeeping mission in the region of Donbas.5 Previously, on 14 April 2014 and on 23 
February 2015, other two requests were filed for the deployment of UN peacekeeping 
forces in the territory of Eastern Ukraine.6 In these last two requests reference was made to 
the possibility to involve the European Union as a mediator among the opposing parties and 
as a regional provider of peacekeeping operations under a UN mandate.7 The European 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 In this article ÔEastern UkraineÕ is referred to as including the ÔoblastsÕ of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv. 
2 R Mllerson, ÔUkraine: Victim of GeopoliticsÕ (2014) 13(1) Chinese Journal of International Law 133; BR 
Roth, ÔThe Neglected Virtues of Bright Lines: International Law in the 2014 Ukraine CrisesÕ (2015) 21(2) 
ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 317. 
3 Y Shany, ÔDoes International Law Grant the People of Crimea and Donetsk a Right to Secede? Revisiting 
Self-Determination in Light of the 2014 Events in UkraineÕ (2014) 21(1) Brown Journal of World Affairs 
233; U zsu, ÔUkraine, International Law, and the Political Economy of Self-DeterminationÕ (2015) 16(3) 
German Law Journal 434. 
4 A Gilder, ÔUkrainian Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity Ð Has It Been Breached?Õ (2014) 3(2) Legal 
Issues Journal 23; O Korhonen, ÔDeconstructing the Conflict in Ukraine: The Relevance of International Law 
to Hybrid States and WarsÕ (2015) 16(3) German Law Journal 452. 
5 See <http://un.mfa.gov.ua/en/press-center/news/43644-postijnij-predstavnik-ukrajini-pri-oon-vruchiv-oficijn 
i-povnovazhennya> accessed 30 May 2016. 
6 The first request came from Mr Oleksandr Turchynov, who became President of Ukraine in February 2014. 
ÔUkraine Wants U.N. Troops in Eastern CitiesÕ Time (14 April 2014), <http://time.com/61624/ukraine-united-
nations-troops-east/> accessed 30 May 2016. The second request was made by the new President Poroshenko 
during an emergency meeting of Ukraine's national security and defence council. ÔUkraine Conflict: 
Poroshenko Calls for UN PeacekeepersÕ BBC News (19 February 2015), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/ne ws/world-
europe-31527414> accessed 30 May 2016. 
7 On European Union and peacekeeping, see T Tardy, ÔEU-UN Cooperation in Peacekeeping: A Promising 
Relationship in A Constrained EnvironmentÕ in M Ortega (ed), ÔThe European Union and the United NationsÐ
Partners in Effective MultilateralismÕ (2005) 78 Chaillot Papers 49.  
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authorities, for their part, have declined any involvement, leaving the matter to the UN and 
the Security Council.8 
 Considering the request of the Ukrainian authorities, two questions arise about the 
possible deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in Eastern Ukraine. The first is whether 
the request is legitimate. Indeed, in order to have a UN peacekeeping operation in a civil 
war, some conditions must be met.9 When these conditions are not fulfilled, the request 
must be dismissed. Doing otherwise will have negative consequences for the lawfulness 
and the legitimacy of the operation and for the cooperation between the parties to the 
dispute and the UN forces.10 The second question is whether the UN General Assembly has 
decision-making powers on the matter. The traditional view holds that the UN Security 
Council has a monopoly over peacekeeping.11  But when there is a deadlock because of the 
opposition of one or more Permanent Members of the Council, there is an urgency to find 
an alternative, effective solution. Therefore, the relevant question is to what extent the 
General Assembly can authorise a peacekeeping operation when the Security Council 
cannot because one of its permanent members vetoes the decision.  
 Departing from the traditional approach for the deployment of UN peacekeeping 
operations (i.e. to rely exclusively on the Security CouncilÕs authorization), in this article 
the author argues for the possibility to have a UN peacekeeping operation in Eastern 
Ukraine established by the UN General Assembly. Although in the past some scholars have 
focused on the General AssemblyÕs involvement in peacekeeping,12 the recent literature 
fails to engage with the topic of the competence of the General Assembly in deploying 
peacekeeping forces.13 Moreover, the scholarship does not consider the possibility to have a 
peacekeeping mission in Eastern Ukraine, neither authorized by the Security Council, nor 
by the General Assembly. This article seeks to fill these gaps and to propose a new 
understanding of the UN General Assembly role in peacekeeping, specifically focusing on 
the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. 
 To achieve its aim, this article is divided into two substantive parts. The first part 
focuses on the legitimacy of the request, and it recalls the requirements for having a lawful 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8  ÔEU WonÕt Send Armed Force to Ukraine Despite ClashesÕ BBC News (27 April 2015), 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-32478933> accessed 30 May 2016. 
9 D Bratt, ÔExplaining Peacekeeping Performance: the UN in Internal ConflictsÕ (1997) 4(3) International 
Peacekeeping 45, 62ff; H Nasu, International Law on Peacekeeping: A Study of Article 40 of the UN Charter 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 17-27. 
10 On the theory and law of peacekeeping operations, see Nasu (n 9). 
11 Nasu (n 9). Referring to regional peace operations, see R Durward, ÔSecurity Council Authorization for 
Regional Peace Operations: A Critical AnalysisÕ (2006) 13(3) International Peacekeeping 350. 
12 DW Bowett, United Nations Forces: A Legal Study of United Nations Practice (Stevens and Sons 1964); F 
Seyersted, United Nations Force in the Law of Peace and War (AW Sijthoff 1966). 
13 Exceptions are AJ Carswell, ÔUnblocking the UN Security Council: The Uniting for Peace ResolutionÕ 
(2013) 18(3) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 453; K Hossain, ÔThe Complementary Role of the United 
Nations General Assembly in Peace ManagementÕ (2008) 13 Uluslararasi Hukuk Ve Politika (Review of 
International Law and Politics) 77. 
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peacekeeping operation. In particular, the author takes into account the factual situation in 
Eastern Ukraine, considering the reasons for the deployment of peacekeeping forces in that 
territory, and the existence of an internal armed conflict. Then, the analysis centres on the 
required conditions of peacekeeping operations, specifically focusing on host state consent 
and examining the consent expressed by the Ukrainian Government. The second part of the 
article examines the role of the General Assembly in authorizing UN peacekeeping 
operations. First, attention is given to the division of roles and functions between the 
Security Council and the General Assembly in the field of peacekeeping. Second, the 
author argues that, taking into account the precedent of the ÔUniting for PeaceÕ 
Resolution,14 there is a competence of the General Assembly on the matter, the Assembly 
can authorize a peacekeeping mission in Eastern Ukraine, and this avoids the deadlock of 
the Security Council (due to the Russian refusal to allow a peacekeeping operation in 
Ukraine). In concluding, the author offers some reflections about the impact of the 
proposed UN General AssemblyÕs involvement in Eastern Ukraine on the future 
deployment of peacekeeping operations worldwide. 
 
2. The Legitimacy of A Request 
 
In the international legal system, the UN can use different measures for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes: (i) conflict prevention; (ii) peacemaking; (iii) peacekeeping; (iv) 
peace enforcement; and (v) peacebuilding.15 
 As for peacekeeping operations,16 in order to be legitimate and overcome the 
criticisms of the last decades,17 they must conform to three core principles: (i) consent of 
the parties; (ii) impartiality; and (iii) non-use of force, except in the case of self-defence and 
defence of the mandate.18 The elements of particular concern for this analysis are the 
consent expressed by the Ôhost stateÕ Ukraine, the need to gather the consent of all the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 UN, GA Res 377 A (V) ÔUniting for PeaceÕ, 3 November 1950, UN Doc A/1775, 10. 
15 This distinction results from the debate within the scholarship and from the practice of the UN. See UN 
DPKO, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine) (2008) 17-
18; R Hatto, ÔFrom Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: The Evolution of the Role of the United Nations in Peace 
OperationsÕ (2013) 95(891-892) International Review of the Red Cross 495. 
16 AJ Bellamy, P Williams and S Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping (2nd rev edn, Polity 2010); T Benner, 
S Mergenthaler and P Rotmann, The New World of UN Peace Operations. Learning to Build Peace? (OUP 
2011); J Koops and others (eds), The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (OUP 
2015). 
17 For instance, regarding the efficacy of peacekeeping operations, the accountability of peacekeepers, and the 
standards for a successful peacekeeping operation. In order to ameliorate the system of peacekeeping, the UN 
has issued the ÔBrahimi ReportÕ in 2008. See ND White, ÔCommentary on the Report of the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations (The Brahimi Report)Õ (2001) 6(1) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 127; C 
Gray, ÔPeacekeeping After the Brahimi Report: Is There a Crisis of Credibility for the UN?Õ (2001) 6(2) 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 267.  
18 Capstone Doctrine (n 15) 31. 
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parties to the conflict, and the question of the impartiality of the UN mission. Indeed, given 
the complexity of the war in Eastern Ukraine, it is important to determine the legitimacy of 
the request of the UN operation, in order to have an effective mission and to avoid any 
possible objections to it. 
 Taking into account the factual, legal, and legitimacy conditions for a peacekeeping 
mission, in this section the author argues that the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, along with the 
Ukrainian request, permits the UN to consider the request legitimate and to deploy 
peacekeeping forces in that territory. 
 
A. Conditions for Peacekeeping 
 
In the analysis of peacekeeping operations, three important elements must be taken into 
account: (i) the factual conditions for their deployment; (ii) the legal conditions that trigger 
the intervention of the UN forces in a specific country; and (iii) the additional conditions 
that ensure the legitimacy of the operations. 
 A UN peacekeeping operation is deployed in a State when there is a situation of 
conflict and violence,19 and its general aim is to maintain peace through diplomatic 
means.20 The mission can Ôfacilitate an accommodation of conflict by diplomatic meansÕ 
(traditional peacekeeping), and it can guarantee Ôa minimal protection of a civilian 
populationÕs human rightsÕ (strategic peacekeeping).21 The reasons that underpin the use of 
peacekeeping forces must be checked at the beginning of the operation, and throughout its 
development.22 This helps to guarantee the maintenance of the legitimacy of the operation 
and to avoid an ÔabusiveÕ presence of the UN forces in a country. 
 Peacekeeping missions must be evaluated considering also their outcomes and the 
beneficial effects obtained in a conflict.23 Indeed, they are used for short-term objectives 
(e.g. the end of a war), but also for the achievement of long-term goals, such as the 
reconstruction of the legal, political and economic system of a country;24 or the protection 
and promotion of human rights.25 Confronting the results achieved with the content of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 W Hansen, O Ramsbotham and T Woodhouse, ÔHawks and Doves: Peacekeeping and Conflict ResolutionÕ 
in A Austin, M Fischer and N Ropers (eds), Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict: The Berghof Handbook 
(Springer 2004). 
20 J Burk, ÔWhat Justifies Peacekeeping?Õ (2000) 12(3) Peace Review 467; MJ Mullenbach, ÔDeciding to 
Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping 
MissionsÕ (2005) 49(3) International Studies Quarterly 529; TD Gill and D Fleck (eds), The Handbook of the 
International Law of Military Operations (OUP 2010) 136. 
21 Burk (n 20) 468. 
22 ibid 472. 
23 PF Diehl and D Druckman, ÔEvaluating Peace OperationsÕ in Koops and others (n 16). 
24 M Ndulo, ÔUnited Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Security and ReconstructionÕ (2011) 44(3) Akron 
Law Review 769. 
25 A Murdie and DR Davis, ÔProblematic Potential: The Human Rights Consequences of Peacekeeping 
Interventions in Civil WarsÕ (2010) 32(1) Human Rights Quarterly 49. 
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mandate of the peacekeeping mission, it is possible to determine its successes and 
failures.26 
 Peacekeeping operations can be deployed: (i) when there is violence inter-states; or 
(ii) when the violence is intra-state.27 The difference lies in the subjects giving consent to 
the peacekeeping mission. In inter-states conflicts, the States involved must give consent to 
the UN for a peacekeeping operation.28 Instead, in intra-state conflicts, it is sufficient to 
have the consent of the State in which the dispute is ongoing.29 In relation to this 
distinction, an additional interesting aspect is the influence that peacekeeping operations 
can have over the classification of the conflict.30 
 When there is an internal conflict,31 a state may request a UN operation for various 
reasons.32 One example would be when it encounters difficulties in maintaining peace and 
security in its own territory and the Government decides to rely upon the help of the UN 
forces.33 The request for UN intervention may be justified also because (i) there is a threat 
to the democratic life of the country and to its institutions, and (ii) there is an escalation of 
violence (e.g. a civil war or an internal armed conflict).34 In other cases, the request for an 
intervention has been justified to fight terrorists or other non-state actors (e.g. insurgents 
and rebels) that represent a threat to the democratic life of a country and to the international 
community as a whole.35 
 From the foregoing considerations, it can be posited that the factual conditions 
necessary for the deployment of a peacekeeping operation are: (i) the existence of an 
internal armed conflict; and (ii) the necessity to preserve peace and security, through the 
cessation of the hostilities and the disengagement of the opponents. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 ibid. 
27 Burk (n 20) 467. 
28 Koops and others (n 16) 48. 
29 On peacekeeping in intra-state conflicts, see R Weiner and CA Aguilera Ariza, ÔWar, the United Nations, 
and PeacekeepingÕ (2015) 27(1) New England Journal of Public Policy 1. 
30 E David and O Engdahl, ÔHow Does the Involvement of a Multinational Peacekeeping Force Affect the 
Classification of a Situation?Õ (2013) 95(891-892) International Review of the Red Cross 659. 
31 LM Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (CUP 2008). 
32 L Neack, ÔUN Peace-keeping: In the Interest of the Community or Self?Õ (1995) 32(2) Journal of Peace 
Research 181. 
33 See the cases of Chad and Mali. On the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations in civil wars, see VP 
Fortna, ÔDoes Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil 
WarÕ (2004) 48(2) International Studies Quarterly 269. 
34 On the geography of peacekeeping missions, see M Gilligan and SJ Stedman, ÔWhere Do the Peacekeepers 
Go?Õ (2003) 5(4) International Studies Review 37; AA Townsen and BW Reeder, ÔWhere Do Peacekeepers 
Go When They Go? Explaining the Spatial Heterogeneity of Peacekeeping DeploymentsÕ (2014) 18(1-2) 
Journal of International Peacekeeping 69.  
35 A recent intervention for combating terrorism was in Mali, which followed a GovernmentÕs submission of a 
request to the UN Security Council in 2013. K Bannelier and T Christakis, ÔUnder the UN Security CouncilÕs 
Watchful Eyes: Military Intervention by Invitation in the Malian ConflictÕ (2013) 26(4) Leiden Journal of 
International Law 855. 
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 In order to have peacekeeping forces deployed in a territory, some legal and 
legitimacy conditions must also be met. These are linked to the Ôcore principlesÕ36 
underpinning peacekeeping operations: (i) the impartiality of the operation;37 (ii) the non-
use of force;38 and (iii) the gathering of host state consent. In order to evaluate the request 
of the Ukrainian Government for peacekeeping, the author focuses on the consent given to 
the UN operation and the impartiality of the mission. 
 From a legal point of view, consent is a fundamental element of peacekeeping and it 
is required to avoid the violation of statesÕ sovereignty.39 As it has been pointed out by the 
scholarship, consent is the requisite for the creation of international obligations and for the 
legal basis of peacekeeping operations.40 It is a constitutive element of peacekeeping 
operations, and, without it, the UN would violate Article 2(7) of the UN Charter and the 
principles of sovereignty of states and non-intervention.41 Indeed, through the consent of 
the host State, the UN guarantees that the peacekeeping mission deployed is lawful and the 
country in which it operates welcomes it. With no consent, the mission would be negatively 
affected and it would lose credibility before the international and local community.42 
Moreover, with no consent the UN forces deployed risk becoming a party to the conflict, 
losing their role as ÔpeacekeepersÕ.43 
 Consent is also the distinctive element between peace enforcement operations and 
peacekeeping operations. 44  When there is host state consent, the operation is of 
ÔpeacekeepingÕ, and there is no imposition on the parties of the conflict and no coercive 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Bratt (n 9); Capstone Doctrine (n 15) 31ff. 
37 S Vohra, ÔImpartiality in United Nations Peace-KeepingÕ (1996) 9(1) Leiden Journal of International Law 
63; H Yamashita, ÔÔImpartialÕ Use of Force in United Nations PeacekeepingÕ (2008) 15(5) International 
Peacekeeping 615. 
38 R Murphy, ÔUnited Nations Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia, and the Use of ForceÕ (2003) 8(1) 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 71; D Stephens, ÔThe Lawful Use of Force by Peacekeeping Forces: The 
Tactical ImperativeÕ (2005) 12(2) International Peacekeeping 157; J Sloan, ÔThe Evolution of the Use of 
Force in UN PeacekeepingÕ (2014) 37(5) Journal of Strategic Studies 674. 
39 Nasu (n 9) 17ff; Koops and others (n 16) 48-50; MI Latif and RA Khan, ÔPeacekeeping Operations and 
State Sovereignty: Dilemma of Host State ConsentÕ (2010) 30(2) Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences 235. 
The maintenance of host State consent is also problematic. J Karlsrud and DF da Costa, ÔInvitation 
Withdrawn: Humanitarian Action, United Nations Peacekeeping, and State Sovereignty in ChadÕ (2013) 37(2) 
Disasters 171. 
40 A Orakhelashvili, ÔThe Legal Basis of the United Nations Peace-Keeping OperationsÕ (2003) 43(2) Virginia 
Journal of International Law 485, 518. The growing importance of this element is also recalled in the 
Capstone Doctrine (n 15), where it was affirmed that the lack of consent might challenge Ôthe rationale for the 
United Nations peacekeeping operation and will likely alter the core assumptions and parameters 
underpinning the international communityÕs strategy to support the peace processÕ. 
41 J Sloan, The Militarisation of Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century (Bloomsbury Publishing 2011) 76. 
42 A lack of consent is admissible only when the Security Council Ôbelieves that the conflict presents a threat 
to international peace and securityÕ or Ôfor humanitarian or protection purposesÕ: Capstone Doctrine (n 15) 43. 
43 ibid 32. 
44 Gill and Fleck (n 20) 137; L Mller, ÔThe Force Intervention BrigadeÑUnited Nations Forces beyond the 
Fine Line Between Peacekeeping and Peace EnforcementÕ (2015) 20(3) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 
359.  
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measure adopted by the UN. In the case of peace enforcement operations, instead, the UN 
imposes the application and respect of peace agreements over the parties with coercive 
measures, irrespective of the consent of the host State.45 
 The consent of the host state must be analysed taking into account two aspects: the 
external and the internal.46 Concerning the former, consent must be freely expressed and it 
cannot be subjected to any external influence.47 The influence occurs when the Government 
of a country is under illicit pressures and it is subject to the threat of another state and/or of 
foreign forces.48 If the government of a country is pushed to accept the presence of 
peacekeeping forces in its territory because of economic, political or legal pressure made 
upon it by the international community, the consent is altered and it is not genuine.49 In this 
case, the UN cannot allow a peacekeeping intervention. 
 The internal aspect of host state consent requires that a lawful authority of the state 
shall express the consent and it must meet the ratione personae condition.50 This second 
element is quite complex and it relates to the legitimacy of the authority requiring the 
intervention. First of all, the problem is to determine who can be regarded as a legitimate 
subject that can lawfully request a UN intervention.51 According to the literature, the 
Government that has the effective control over the territory and the population is deemed to 
be legitimate for this purpose.52 The legitimate national authority is that resulting from a 
democratic process in the society, in line with the rule of law and the principles of 
international law.53 Second, a problem arises when there is an internal conflict and the state 
is divided into different factions. Here the political and social situation of a state is unstable 
and it is subject to flux.54 In this sense, sometimes it is difficult to rely upon the consent of 
the parties in a country because the actors Ômay appear or disappear too quicklyÕ and Ôtheir 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Capstone Doctrine (n 15) 43. 
46 I Johnstone, ÔManaging Consent in Contemporary Peacekeeping OperationsÕ (2011) 18(2) International 
Peacekeeping 168. ÔBroadly speaking, consent to a peacekeeping mission is typically granted as an adjunct to 
a peace agreement, in the form of an invitation to the UN or other organization to support the implementation. 
Yet in practice, consent is often qualified in one of three ways: it is either unreliable, or brought about by 
external pressure, or open-endedÕ: ibid 170. 
47 Gill and Fleck (n 20) 230. 
48 Sloan (n 41) 119. 
49 As in the case of Sudan, where the consent to a hybrid AU/UN force in Darfur Ôcame about only after 
government was subjected to considerable international pressureÕ: ibid 119. 
50 On the actors that can express consent, see I Johnstone, The Power of Deliberation: International Law, 
Politics and Organizations (OUP 2011) 144ff. 
51 C Gray, ÔHost-State Consent and United Nations Peacekeeping in YugoslaviaÕ (1996) 7(1) Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law 241. On the process of formation of consent and its democratic 
connotation, see DH Levine, The Morality of Peacekeeping (OUP 2014). 
52 D Wippman, ÔMilitary Intervention, Regional Organizations, and Host-State ConsentÕ (1996) 7(1) Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 209, 211-2. 
53 ibid 212. 
54  For instance, in Mali the consent to a UN operation was given by the interim President of the State. France 
considered it as a sufficient element to intervene in its support, even if the President was not recognised as the 
legitimate authority of the entire country. Bannelier and Christakis (n 35) 859. 
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interests may be too fluidÕ.55 Third, another problem is when in theory an authority is 
entitled to give the consent, but in practice it might not, because it is challenged by other 
competing actors in the state.56 In this case, the Government can be regarded as a legitimate 
interlocutor if it maintains a certain control over the territory of the country.57 
 Finally, a peacekeeping operation must be not only legally justified, but also 
legitimate.58 This means that when all the legal requirements have been met, the parties to 
the conflict have to accept the mission, legitimising its presence in the country.59 In this 
regard, consent becomes a pivotal element for the legitimacy of peacekeeping operations,60 
and it is strictly related also to the determination of the impartiality of the UN mission.61 
The core question here pertains the legitimacy of a request for a peacekeeping operation 
and the legitimacy of the operation itself when there is no consent of all the warring 
factions. Indeed, as it happened in previous UN operations, even if the legality of the 
mission is ascertained, there might be a problem for its legitimacy as not all the parties 
accept it.62 Looking at the precedents of the UN history of peacekeeping, the lack of 
consent of all the parties involved in a conflict has resulted in less effective operations and 
in a difficult relationship between the UN forces and the actors present in the country.63 In 
particular, in the Suez crisis, Egypt has given its consent to a UN operation, but soon after 
it withdrew it.64 This caused a harsh time for the UN forces deployed and for the 
international community that was trying to solve the conflict. In Congo, the withdrawal of 
the consent to the UN operation has created great uncertainty over the continuation of the 
mission, and it has undermined its actions.65 Despite these experiences, the actual policy of 
the UN does not require necessarily the consent of all the parties for the deployment of 
peacekeeping forces, but focuses on the impartiality of the operation.66 As it is underlined 
by the scholarship, in modern conflicts the UN cannot seek to gather the consent of all the 
parties to the war due to the diverse nature of the conflict (i.e. including a plurality of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 N Tsagourias, ÔConsent, Neutrality/Impartiality and the Use of Force in Peacekeeping: Their Constitutional 
DimensionÕ (2006) 11(3) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 465, 474. 
56 ibid 475. 
57 ibid. 
58  M Mersiades, ÔPeacekeeping and Legitimacy: Lessons from Cambodia and SomaliaÕ (2005) 12(2) 
International Peacekeeping 205. 
59 ibid. 
60 ÔThe management of the peacekeeperÕs legitimacy is the best tool for maximizing local actor consent and 
preventing active opposition to peacekeeping operationsÕ: ibid. 
61 JT OÕNeill and N Rees, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era (Routledge 2005) 33-4; K 
Beck, ÔThe Challenges of Consent: Policy Recommendations for Maintaining Host State Consent for United 
Nations Peacekeeping MissionsÕ (2011) DWA Student Scholarship. 
62 For instance, in the case of the Suez crisis, Congo, and Somalia. Sloan (n 41) 20ff. 
63 OÕNeill and Rees (n 61) 26-7. 
64 ibid 24. 
65 ibid 43ff. 
66 SAN Tshiband, ÔPeacekeeping: A Civilian Perspective?Õ (2010) 1(2) Journal of Conflictology 1, 5. 
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actors).67 For this reason, the UN operations need to receive only Ôthe consent of the main 
or relevant partiesÕ.68 In this regard, there is a distinction between the consent given by the 
main party (i.e. the host state), called ÔstrategicÕ, and the consent of the other parties (i.e. 
non-state actors), called ÔtacticalÕ.69 Whereas the strategic consent is always necessary, the 
tactical is not.70 Therefore, even if in the past the consent of all the parties has shown to be 
quite relevant for the legitimacy of the operation, nowadays this element is not compulsory. 
 As a last remark, in relation to the legitimacy of the request of a UN peacekeeping 
operation, another relevant condition is the ÔimpartialityÕ of the operation.71 This must be 
distinguished from the ÔneutralityÕ72 of a UN mission: the first concerns the conduct of the 
operation; the second relates to its nature.73 In this regard, the UN mission cannot favour 
any of the parties to the conflict and it cannot be biased. Nonetheless, the UN forces cannot 
admit any actions of the parties that will threaten or violate the peace agreements reached.74 
Impartiality is strictly linked to the consent expressed to the presence of peacekeeping 
forces in the territory of a state.75 Indeed, if the UN mission lacks consent of the main 
parties, it might be seen as partial and acting in favour of one party. Once again, the 
element of consent gathers importance for the legitimacy of a UN peacekeeping request and 
of the mission itself as it permits the UN forces to be considered impartial. 
 
B. Ascertaining the Conditions for Peacekeeping in Eastern Ukraine 
 
In order to understand whether UN peacekeeping forces can be sent to Eastern Ukraine, the 
author makes here some considerations on the features of the conflict, and on the consent to 
peacekeeping expressed by the Ukrainian Government. 
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Fig. 1. Eastern Ukraine territories 
  
 The conflict in Eastern Ukraine finds its origins in 2014, but the contrasts between 
the central Government and the local authorities have been evident already in previous 
years.76 After a popular insurrection in February 2014, President Janukovyč was forced to 
leave the country, and a period of internal instability begun. The conflict is between the 
forces of the central Government in Kiev and the pro-Russian insurgents of Eastern 
Ukraine that want to achieve independence.77 The separatists are in control of the region of 
Donbas and there is evidence that they have been supported financially and militarily by 
Russia.78 
 As for the nature of the conflict, it is necessary to determine whether the conflict is 
intra-state or inter-states: as already recalled, this classification has consequences also for 
the operation of peacekeeping forces in the territory concerned.79 In this regard, in internal 
conflicts peacekeeping missions would operate within the domestic jurisdiction of states.80 
Therefore, in this case there is the necessity to gain the host stateÕs consent. In the case of 
Eastern Ukraine, many scholars consider the conflict as internal, between the Ukrainian 
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central authorities and the separatists.81 In support of this interpretation, in July 2014 the 
ICRC has defined it as a Ônon-international armed conflictÕ calling the parties to respect the 
norms of International Humanitarian Law governing these types of cases.82 
 On 5 September 2014, the opposing parties signed a cease-fire agreement in Belarus 
known as the ÔMinsk ProtocolÕ, trying to come to a peaceful settlement of the dispute, 
without any further engagement of military actions.83 The cease-fire has not lasted long and 
it has been breached by a series of military actions of the pro-Russia separatists against 
governmental units. On 12 February 2015, another peace agreement (called ÔMinsk IIÕ) was 
signed,84 but the region continues to live in a situation that is Ôtense and volatileÕ, as 
described in one of the last Security Council briefings.85 
 Regarding the international communityÕs reaction to the conflict, soon after the war 
begun, the Security Council held a meeting to discuss the situation in Ukraine, based on a 
request of the Ukrainian representative to the UN.86 This was later followed by a series of 
meetings between 2014 and the beginning of 2015 and by the adoption of two resolutions: 
one concerning the shooting down of the civil flight MH17; the other in support of the 
Minsk peace agreements signed in February 2015.87 At the beginning of 2014, the General 
Assembly adopted a resolution calling for an end to the conflict and for the respect of the 
territorial integrity of Ukraine.88 Neither the Security Council meetings nor the resolutions 
adopted have taken into consideration the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Eastern 
Ukraine, and the focus has been more on the violations of International Law occurring in 
these territories (in terms of respect for the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the indirect 
intervention of Russia), rather than on adopting a concrete plan for pacifying the area. The 
international community has been divided between those supporting the position of Ukraine 
and those adopting a more careful approach, due to the direct involvement of Russia in the 
conflict.89 
 Only recently the UN has taken concrete action and there has been the creation of a 
ÔMine Action Needs Assessment MissionÕ that has worked in Eastern Ukraine from 23 
January until 5 February 2016. The task of the Mission has been to assess the presence of 
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mines and explosive munitions in the territory and make recommendations for further 
action to be taken as part of a humanitarian intervention.90 This is a first step in the path 
towards peace and reconciliation and it might be a useful tool for laying the foundations of 
a future peacekeeping mission in Eastern Ukraine. Indeed, despite the specific mandate of 
the Mission, this is the first time that the UN sends a Mission to Eastern Ukraine to 
determine the status of the conflict, even if just from a ÔtechnicalÕ point of view. The 
question arising from the end of this Mission is what further action the UN is willing to 
take, considering the reiterated requests by the Ukrainian Government for the deployment 
of peacekeeping forces in that territory.  
 Following these reflections, since the failure of the peace agreements signed in 
2015, a peacekeeping mission in Eastern Ukraine is even more urgent. Indeed, 
Ôpeacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where 
fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the 
peacemakersÕ.91 A UN peacekeeping operation might be a good choice to preserve peace 
and security in Eastern Ukraine and to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis.92 In 
particular, peacekeeping forces would guarantee at least Ôshort termÕ effects,93 preventing a 
further escalation of violence between the opponents and a better protection of the civilian 
population involved in the conflict.94 In this sense, peacekeeping is a useful conflict 
management tool and it helps the international community to prevent the breaking out of 
civil wars in war-torn states.95  
 Turning to the condition of host state consent, in the Ukrainian case this is a core 
element of the peacekeeping mission that would act in the territory. This is true not only for 
fulfilling the legal requirements underpinning a peacekeeping operation, but also for 
guaranteeing the legitimacy of the mission and its success.96 
 Concerning the external and internal aspects of the Ukrainian consent, some points 
must be underlined. First, the consent expressed is free from any external influence and it 
reflects the will of the state to maintain the control over the national territory and to avoid 
further conflicts with the insurgents. Indeed, the Ukrainian Government has asked for a 
peacekeeping mission on various occasions, at various stages of the conflict, and through 
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its different Presidents, without being forced to do so by the international community or by 
external forces. 
 Second, in Ukraine the consent has been expressed by a new Government that has 
not been democratically elected and that is the result of a popular insurrection against the 
previous regime, involving only a part of the territory and of the population. Nevertheless, 
from a political and juridical point of view, the Government controls the majority of 
Ukraine and it is recognised by other international actors as representative of the country.97 
Therefore, in the light of the principles above mentioned, it can be considered as legitimate. 
Moreover, as the scholarship underlines, the consent is requested from a state that has not 
only the effective control, but also the juridical sovereignty over a territory.98 In Ukraine, 
the Government exercises the jurisdictional control when it acts through the political, social 
and administrative institutions of the country. The legitimacy of the authorities in Kiev is 
confirmed also by the fact that on 17 April 2014 the Ukrainian Government submitted a 
declaration to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in which it accepts the CourtÕs 
jurisdiction with respect to the alleged crimes committed in Ukraine during the so-called 
ÔMaidan protestsÕ.99 The ICC has accepted it100 and this fact can be regarded as the 
confirmation of the recognition of the Government in Kiev as the legitimate representative 
of the country and as being able to express the will of the Ukrainian people. Indeed, from a 
legal point of view, when a State decides to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC it does it in 
its official functions, as a legitimate authority of a country.101 Thus, the ICCÕs acceptance 
of the Ukrainian decision is in line with the recognition of the Ukrainian Government as the 
national authority of reference. 
 Some final considerations must be made on the additional element of whether, for a 
legitimate peacekeeping operation, it is also required to have the consent of other parties 
than the host State, such as the non-state actors active in the national territory.102 Indeed, 
when there is an internal conflict, some scholars think that it is necessary to have the 
consent of all the parties involved, despite the fact that they are rebels or separatists.103 For 
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the supporters of this position, Ôsustainable peace requires inclusive politicsÕ,104 thus the 
involvement of a plurality of subjects is necessary. Indeed, it would strengthen the 
legitimacy and efficiency of the UN operation, and facilitate its actions.105 However, as 
already underlined, this condition is not compulsory, and it is only a factor that can help the 
peace process and can be sought for the expediency of the operation.106 In Ukraine, it is 
uncertain whether the consent to a peacekeeping operation will be given by all the parties 
involved, because of the nature of the conflict and of the different interests at stake. 
Moreover, considering the strong opposition between the parties, and the failure of the 
cease-fire, it seems unlikely that they would all come to an agreement on the deployment of 
peacekeeping forces. In this case, the Ukrainian GovernmentÕs consent is sufficient as it is 
expressed by the party representing ÔofficiallyÕ the state. Therefore, the consent expressed 
is that of the Ômain actorÕ in the conflict and it is adequate to guarantee the legitimacy of the 
request and a ÔrobustÕ peacekeeping operation.107 Even if it would be desirable to gather the 
consent of all the parties involved in the conflict, a peacekeeping operation can be deployed 
when there is only the host state governmentÕs consent.108 
 From the foregoing considerations, it is posited that the request of the Ukrainian 
Government is legitimate. 
 
3. The Competence of the UN General Assembly 
 
Once the legitimacy of the request of a UN peacekeeping operation in Eastern Ukraine is 
established, it is necessary to determine which organ has the competence to deploy UN 
peacekeepers. UN peacekeeping operations are usually authorised by the Security Council 
under Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter. As indicated in Article 24 of the Charter, the 
Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security. This means that it has a pivotal role in dealing with peacekeeping operations 
and it can decide to authorise them with a resolution, after the host State has given its 
consent. The problem arises when the Security Council experiences a deadlock that 
impedes any decision.109 A possible solution can come from the involvement of the UN 
General Assembly as the alternative subject that can authorise peacekeeping operations. 
This would guarantee the achievement of the goals of the UN, despite the difficulties faced 
by the Security Council. Notwithstanding the traditional division of functions between the 
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Security Council and the General Assembly, in various occasions the Charter has been 
interpreted broadly in order to fulfil the exigencies of the international community.110 In 
this sense, there might be a case for a different interpretation of the Charter.111 
 
A. A New Understanding of Peacekeeping Authorisation 
(i) Security Council and General Assembly in peacekeeping: between traditional roles and 
new functions 
 
In the analysis of the UN General Assembly competence for peacekeeping, a relevant 
element is the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly and 
their division of powers on the matter.112 It must be underlined that there is no normative 
definition of ÔpeacekeepingÕ, the UN Charter does not regulate expressly peacekeeping 
operations, and there are no specific norms that indicate the functions of the Security 
Council or the General Assembly in this regard.113 Nevertheless, peacekeeping operations 
are traditionally considered part of the UN actions to solve conflicts and to cease 
hostilities.114  
 The Security Council and the General Assembly have clear, distinct functions and 
powers in the context of international peace and security.115 According to art. 24(1) of the 
Charter, the members of the UN Ôconfer on the Security Council primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and securityÕ.116 Therefore, the Security Council is 
the organ in charge of guaranteeing that peace and security are preserved worldwide and it 
performs this duty with the powers granted under Chapter VI, VII, and VIII of the 
Charter.117 The Security Council can refer to a range of measures, including peacekeeping. 
The interventions authorized by the Security Council can include the use of force, but in the 
specific case of peacekeeping, no use of force is permitted except for self-defence. The 
General Assembly plays a different role regarding peacekeeping: it can make 
recommendations (except when the Council is already involved in the matter) and it can 
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call the attention of the Security Council to situations that might endanger international 
peace and security.118 
 At first blush, the two organs seem to have completely different roles and functions 
in the field of international peace and security, and it seems that there is a hierarchy 
between them, with the Security Council at the top. This interpretation has received wide 
endorsement throughout the years,119 but despite its appealing guise, it lacks argumentative 
strength when it conceives the UN as a pyramidal system. Indeed, it can be contested on the 
basis of three arguments. First, the Security CouncilÕs ÔprimaryÕ responsibility for 
international peace and security is not ÔexclusiveÕ. In this sense, in the Certain Expenses 
Advisory Opinion,120 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) underlined that there is room 
also for the action of the General Assembly.121 The Security Council has an exclusive role 
when the UN operation to be authorised involves the use of force or coercive measures.122 
As already recalled, peacekeeping operations are authorised under Chapter VI of the UN 
Charter, and they qualify as peaceful measures. Therefore, the Security Council has no 
exclusive role in this field.123 In this sense, ÔprimacyÕ for peace and security means that the 
Security Council should be consulted first, but there is no automatic exclusion of other 
organs that can be involved in the field. Other subjects can act in substitution, especially 
when the Security Council encounters difficulties in taking decisions. Under certain 
conditions, the responsibility for international peace and security can be attributed to the 
General Assembly, which can play an important role in the authorization of peacekeeping 
operations. 124  The role of the General Assembly is not ÔsubsidiaryÕ, but it is 
ÔcomplementaryÕ125 and the two organs of the UN are not competing with each other, but 
they work in cooperation, seeking to facilitate their work mutually.126  Therefore, in 
achieving the goals of peace and security, they work in tandem. This unity of action is a 
core element for guaranteeing an effective response to the threats that endanger the stability 
of the international community and the peace and security of states. In this sense, the 
reinterpretation of the powers of the Security Council regarding peacekeeping missions 
permits the UN to be more effective, avoiding unnecessary hierarchical predominance of 
one organ over the other, and answering the urgent needs for peacekeeping operations 
around the world.  
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 Second, it is possible to expand the scope of the mandate of the General Assembly, 
allowing its involvement in the decisions about the use of peacekeeping forces. From a 
general perspective, the General Assembly does not have binding powers and it can act 
under Chapter VI of the UN Charter with recommendations.127 According to Articles 10 
and 14, the General AssemblyÕs powers are not mandatory, and they only have a 
ÔrecommendatoryÕ function.128 Moreover, as recalled, the General Assembly cannot make 
recommendations on matters that are under the current analysis of the Security Council.129 
Therefore, apparently the General Assembly cannot have any role in the authorization of 
peacekeeping operations, apart from budgetary matters.130 Despite these limits, in the last 
decades, the norms recalled have been interpreted differently and they have experienced an 
Ôerosion processÕ.131 The General Assembly has been granted the powers to initiate an 
action for peacekeeping and to promote the creation of such missions, when reasons of 
peace and security so require.132 The ICJ has stressed this new interpretation of the General 
AssemblyÕs role in the Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion, affirming that Ôthe function 
and powers conferred by the Charter on the General Assembly [É] are not merely 
hortatoryÕ133 and that the General Assembly has the power Ôto organize peacekeeping 
operations, at the request, or with the consent, of the States concernedÕ.134 
 Third, another step in the recognition of the role of the General Assembly in 
peacekeeping can be made considering Article 14 of the UN Charter. This norm states that 
the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any 
situation that results in a violation of the provisions of the Charter.135 The term ÔmeasuresÕ 
has been interpreted broadly, meaning that the General Assembly might engage in some 
actions, although not involving force. 136  Indeed, for operations involving force the 
competence still relies on the Security Council, but for the other possible actions, including 
peacekeeping operations under Chapter VI of the Charter, the General Assembly can have 
competence. Thus, the General Assembly can play an important role in the deployment of 
peacekeeping forces in order to avoid the escalation of a situation that could pose a threat to 
peace.137 It might be argued that the recommendatory nature of the General AssemblyÕs 
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action requires the collaboration of the states willing to comply with it, and thus that it is 
still not so efficient. Nonetheless, when the states (as in the Ukrainian case) are willing to 
act, even if they are not permanent members of the Security Council, the problem does not 
arise. Indeed, the action can be implemented with the deployment of UN forces. In support 
of this argument, one can recall the ICJ Advisory Opinion Construction of a Wall,138 where 
the Court affirmed that it is possible to have a simultaneous action of the two organs of the 
UN in peacekeeping. Indeed, the General Assembly can make recommendations on a 
matter that is already subject to the scrutiny of the Security Council, in the light of the 
principle of cooperation for the preservation of peace and security.139 Once again, it is 
recognised that the pursuit of international peace and security overrides the traditional roles 
of the Security Council and the General Assembly, allowing a more flexible application of 
the CharterÕs provisions. 
 
(ii) Alternative methods in peacekeeping: a case for the General Assembly competence 
 
The situation is Ukraine has shown a dead point to which the Security Council has arrived 
when dealing with matters that affect the interests of one of its permanent members. The 
veto power granted to the permanent members of the Council has become a threat to the 
proper functioning of the organ and it has raised many concerns about the need for reform 
of the Security Council.140 The crisis emerged within the Security Council in relation to the 
conflict in Eastern Ukraine is just the last example of the many occasions in which the 
organ has found itself unable and/or unwilling to take decisions and to act in the pursuit of 
the aims indicated in the Charter, as the pinnacle of the mandate of the UN. In the last 
years, the Security Council has proven weak in overtaking the internal oppositions 
advanced by some of its permanent members, and this has resulted in a de facto stagnation 
of the organ and of the UN as a whole. An example is the case of Syria, where the Security 
Council has proven to be unable to take action in order to cope with the conflict ongoing in 
the country.141 Moreover, in deciding whether to send or not peacekeeping forces in an 
internal conflict, the Security Council has been influenced by not just political but also 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
138 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136.  
139 ibid 150. 
140 B Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 1998); N Schrijver, ÔReforming the UN Security Council in Pursuance of Collective 
SecurityÕ (2007) 12(1) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 127. 
141 P Webb, ÔDeadlock or Restraint? The Security Council Veto and the Use of Force in SyriaÕ (2014) 19(3) 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 471. 
!!
!
20 
economic interests of its permanent members, determining a biased policy of selection of 
the conflicts where to intervene.142  
 Given the restraints experienced by the Security Council in its action, one might ask 
what the alternatives available in the international legal order to overcome the deadlock and 
to seek a solution for conflicts such the one in Eastern Ukraine are.143 The issue is to find 
valid alternatives to the involvement of the Security Council in the deployment of 
peacekeeping missions, for instance recognising similar powers to other organs of the UN 
able to represent the willingness of the majority of the States in the world. In this sense, 
some commentators propose alternative means for authorizing the use of force or 
humanitarian interventions, bypassing the authorization of the Security Council.144 This 
author argues for a shift in the competences between the Security Council and the General 
Assembly when dealing with peacekeeping operations and when the latter faces insuperable 
oppositions within. Indeed, the Security Council should act in the matter of international 
peace and security Ôin order to ensure prompt and effective actionÕ.145 When this does not 
happen, the United Nations has a responsibility to act, adopting through other methods. 
This change does not mean a loss of functions by the Security Council, but the recognition 
to the General Assembly of a parallel competence on the matter, when the Security Council 
cannot act due to the link between the conflict and the interests of one of the permanent 
members.146 
 A step in favour of a competence of the General Assembly in peacekeeping was 
made in 1950 with the Resolution ÔUniting for PeaceÕ. 147  Generally speaking, this 
Resolution is an important development of the law regulating the UN system, as, through 
the Charter framework, it would allow overcoming the political challenges experienced by 
the UN in the past.148 The Resolution dates back to the Fifties, when the Security Council 
experienced a deadlock as the Soviet Union refused to cooperate in authorizing UN 
peacekeeping forces in the Republic of Korea.149 The General Assembly was persuaded to 
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act nonetheless, bypassing the Security Council with a historical decision.150 For the first 
time, the General Assembly could adopt resolutions for the maintenance and promotion of 
international peace and security.151 As for its content, first, the Resolution recognizes that 
even if the Security Council was unable or unwilling to act and to decide on the matter, 
nevertheless the Member States and the UN had a duty to act in order to maintain 
international peace and security.152 Despite the ÔfailureÕ of the Security Council, this does 
not undermine the role of the General Assembly, and it does not relieve it from its 
responsibility to maintain international peace and security. 153  Therefore, the lack of 
decisions by the Security Council would not diminish the role of the General Assembly and 
the need to find a solution to the threat to the international community. Second, it is said 
that when there is no agreement between the Security CouncilÕs members, this brings to a 
failure to exercise its primary responsibility; therefore, the General Assembly can act 
instead of it.154 Specifically, the General Assembly may recommend Ôcollective measuresÕ 
that include not only the imposition of peaceful means, but also the use of force.155 The 
debate on the use of the Resolution 377 has considered mainly this last possibility, with less 
attention given to the peaceful measures that the General Assembly would implement.156 
This implementation of the General AssemblyÕs powers is relevant because its competence 
was broader by the Resolution. In this regard, there has been a different interpretation of the 
General AssemblyÕs functions, permitting it to work for the maintenance of peace and 
security along with the Security Council.157 Third, in order to perform its newly recognised 
function, the General Assembly needs to follow a specific procedure that consists of an 
Ôemergency special sessionÕ that meets within twenty-four hours from the request 
formulated either by the Security Council (with a majority of seven votes in favour), or by 
the majority of the Member States of the UN.158 The provision of a precise procedure with 
qualified majorities permits the UN to guarantee the transparency of the process and its 
legitimacy in terms of acceptance by the Member States. Moreover, it is interesting to 
notice that the process can be triggered in two ways: (i) one that involves the Security 
Council; and (ii) another that relies only on the vote in the General Assembly. This means 
that the procedure is still careful in including the organ that is going to be bypassed (i.e. the 
Security Council), at least as a possibility. 
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 Despite the innovations brought by the Resolution into the UN system and into the 
context of international peace and security, the decision has been highly contested and it 
remains debated.159 Some criticisms are advanced on the understanding that Resolution 377 
Ôcould subvert the well-equilibrated balance of power within the United NationsÕ.160 In this 
authorÕs view, Resolution 377 represents a fundamental step in the development of 
international law and in the implementation of the relationship between the Security 
Council and the General Assembly. Indeed, the fact that the latter can have more powers in 
the field of UN peacekeeping furthers the achievement of the objectives and purposes of 
international law, in particular concerning the cessation of ongoing conflicts. In this sense, 
the Resolution is fundamental as it is the Ôsafety valveÕ that overcomes the difficulties 
emerging from the CouncilÕs deadlock, relying on a wider participation of states.161 
 Another interesting aspect of the present analysis is represented by the precedents in 
the history of the UN in which the General Assembly took the decision of recommending 
collective actions with peacekeeping operations.162 In this regard, the first peacekeeping 
operation in the history of the UN was deployed in 1956.163 Moreover, the General 
Assembly has used its extended powers in other occasions to overcome the Security 
Council deadlock:164 for instance, peacekeeping forces have been sent by the General 
Assembly to Congo.165 The Congo case shows many similarities with the Ukrainian crisis 
as it experienced a dramatic clash between the Soviet Union and western countries, 
respectively supporting different parties to the conflict. In Congo, there was a disagreement 
between the UN forces and the Congolese government, and the Security Council was 
blocked by the veto of the Soviet Union: to overcome the deadlock, the issue was passed to 
the General Assembly that took the decision to use its powers according to Resolution 
377.166 Instead, there is only one case recorded in which the use of force was authorised.167 
This was the case of the crisis in the Republic of Korea in which the General Assembly 
decided to act with the deployment of UN forces, by-passing the deadlock of the Security 
Council. After this episode, there have not been other cases of a direct intervention of the 
General Assembly for the use of force, but only a series of recommendations directed to put 
pressure on the Security Council, in order to respond properly to the request for 
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peacekeeping operations. In general, after the Korean crisis, the number of cases in which 
the General Assembly has been directly involved has been limited, but the non-use of a 
power does not mean that the General Assembly loses its competence for future 
situations.168 
 Recently, there have been other situations similar to the case of Eastern Ukraine, in 
which the Security Council has been unable to take any decision in relation to the use of 
force or the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces. In this sense, the scholarship has 
considered the situation in Syria and the conflict between Israel and Palestine.169 It is said 
that, in order to avoid any incapacity to act within the Security Council due to the use of the 
veto power by the permanent members, one possibility might be the action of the General 
Assembly.170 But the problems arising would include: (i) the fact that the recommendations 
of the General Assembly would have no binding effect; and (ii) the fact that the Resolution 
ÔUniting for PeaceÕ has only been invoked once.171 Other authors, instead, affirm the 
possibility for the General Assembly to be involved in the decision-making process 
regarding the use of force or the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces, considering its 
role as a substitute institution in the context of the UN. In particular, it is said that the 
General Assembly might provoke a debate on the topic and it might recommend certain 
actions to the member states.172 Another solution is to involve the General Assembly in the 
moment in which one of the permanent members abuses its veto power blocking the action 
of the Security Council.173 In this case, the nine non-permanent members of the Security 
Council might refer the question to the General Assembly that could vote by a two-third 
majority for adopting specific measures in the case concerned.174 
 
B. General Assembly Authorisation of Peacekeeping in Eastern Ukraine 
 
Following the new understanding of peacekeeping authorization, the General Assembly can 
have a competence in the deployment of UN forces also in the case of Eastern Ukraine. The 
author argues that this involvement is not only possible, but also necessary.   
 Concerning the ÔpossibilityÕ of such a competence, two points are relevant. First, the 
Security Council is blocked and unable to fulfil its mandate in ceasing the hostilities in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
168  This is also the position of Professor Jos Alvarez as expressed in a recent interview 
<https://www.justsecurity.org/9391/jose-alvarez-ukraine-peacekeepers-security-council-general-assembly-aut 
horization/> accessed 30 May 2016. 
169 Webb (n 141). 
170 ibid 15-16. 
171 ibid 16. 
172 C Henderson, ÔAuthority without Accountability? The UN Security CouncilÕs Authorization Method and 
Institutional Mechanisms of AccountabilityÕ (2014) 19(3) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 489. 
173 Carswell (n 13) 466ff. 
174 ibid. 
!!
!
24 
Eastern Ukraine. As already recalled, the Security Council is significantly divided on the 
matter and this impedes any decision on the use of peacekeeping in the Ukrainian territory. 
The Russian interests in the conflict block the Council in its ÔprimaryÕ role in the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and the entire system of the UN is 
undermined by the veto power of one of its members.175 Second, the conditions indicated in 
the ÔUniting for PeaceÕ Resolution are met. Indeed, as in the case of Korea in 1950, the 
Security Council cannot act and this renders the international communityÕs response to the 
Ukrainian war ineffective. In this sense, the pre-conditions for a General Assembly 
intervention in the case of Eastern Ukraine are fulfilled because (i) in Eastern Ukraine the 
conflict shows Ôthat international tension exists on a dangerous scaleÕ176 and this affects the 
relationships between States within the international community;177 and (ii) there is Ôa lack 
of unanimity of the permanent membersÕ of the Security Council, as requested by the 
Resolution 377.178 It is then the responsibility of the other organ of the UN, i.e. the General 
Assembly, to take action and to decide on the possible deployment of peacekeeping forces 
in Eastern Ukraine. In this regard, the creation of the UN Assessment Mission recalled 
above, shows the willingness of the General Assembly to take responsibility for the 
peaceful settlement of the conflict and to provide an answer to the request of the Ukrainian 
Government for being involved in the matter. 
 The General Assembly involvement in Eastern Ukraine is also necessary. Despite 
the attempts made to reach a peaceful settlement of the dispute (i.e. through the Minsk 
Agreements), the conflict is still ongoing, to the detriment of the civilian population and of 
the credibility of the UN as able to put an end to the war. In Resolution 377 one of the most 
important elements for having a peacekeeping mission was the need to fulfil the purposes 
of the UN in terms of guaranteeing international peace and security, and developing 
friendly relations among nations.179 These purposes are relevant also in the conflict in 
Eastern Ukraine, because of the nature of the war (i.e. internal armed conflict), and of the 
increasing tension between Ukraine and Russia.180 Moreover, as underlined in the reports of 
the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Eastern Ukraine, the humanitarian situation 
in the territory is extremely serious, and human rights violations occur on a daily basis.181 
In this sense, the conflict has a detrimental impact on the economic and social rights of the 
civilian population, and Ôthe interruption of access to basic services is life threatening and 
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can have a life-long impact on the affected population, hindering the post-conflict 
recoveryÕ.182 Therefore, a peacekeeping mission deployed by the General Assembly is 
necessary to avoid further violence, to protect the rights of the population involved, and to 
secure an effective post-conflict restoration of the Ukrainian society. 
 From the foregoing considerations, the author argues that the intervention of UN 
peacekeeping forces in Eastern Ukraine can be authorised by the UN General Assembly, 
following the approach adopted in Resolution 377. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
This article has pointed out that there is an urgent need to send peacekeeping forces in 
Eastern Ukraine in order to promote a peaceful settlement of the conflict and decrease the 
violence between the parties. The attempts made to have a cease-fire have failed and the 
UN is left as the more authoritative subject to address the question and to take action.183 
Nonetheless, the UN has proved to be unable (or unwilling) to do so when the Security 
Council has been involved in the discussion on finding solutions for Eastern Ukraine. The 
interests of Russia specifically, and of the permanent members generally, have impeded any 
decision of the Council about the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Ukraine. The 
deadlock of the Security Council has determined more instability in the region and it has 
exposed the weakness of the UN system when dealing with peacekeeping in civil wars. 
This situation might be improved with different solutions. In this sense, a major 
involvement of the General Assembly and a new interpretation of its powers in 
peacekeeping can be an alternative method. Indeed, through its action, the Security 
CouncilÕs deadlock can be bypassed and a peacekeeping mission can be deployed in 
Eastern Ukraine, following the several requests of the Ukrainian authorities. This argument 
is advanced the understanding of the UN Charter as a Ôliving instrumentÕ.184 This means 
that the Charter indicates the general principles and rules governing the UN system, but 
then these can be interpreted and applied in a way that guarantees the UN to achieve its 
goals, despite the difficulties encountered by one of its organs. Moreover, given the 
peculiar nature of peacekeeping missions that operate within the context of international 
peace and security, but that are not specifically regulated by any Charter provisions, the 
interpretation of the role and function of the Security Council and of the General Assembly 
on the matter can be more flexible than traditionally indicated. In this sense, the ÔUniting 
for PeaceÕ Resolution Ôdemonstrated a willingness on the part of member states to develop 
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a flexible approach to the interpretation of UN Charter provisionsÕ.185 Therefore, when the 
Security Council cannot decide, peacekeeping missions can be authorised even without its 
approval, and the General Assembly can intervene. This substitution does not mean a 
permanent set-aside of the Security Council, but only a temporary answer to a pressing 
need for the protection and the maintenance of international peace and security. 
 For these reasons, and according to the arguments presented in this article, the 
conditions for having a UN peacekeeping operation in Eastern Ukraine are met. In 
particular, the request made by the Ukrainian Government is legitimate, and the General 
Assembly is in charge of authorizing a UN operation. 
 In concluding, some additional remarks must be made about the legal consequences 
that this fact will have for future UN peacekeeping operations, and for the role of the 
General Assembly in this field. The recognition to the General Assembly of the power to 
intervene directly and to authorise peacekeeping missions is undoubtedly a strong 
development of international law. This fact is not only pivotal for the situation of Ukraine, 
but for all the future situations in which the Security Council will encounter a deadlock and 
it will be unable to act for the deployment of peacekeeping forces. The doctrine of the 
alternative role recognised to the General Assembly can have huge effects on the balance of 
powers between the two organs of the UN, and also on the relationship between member 
states of the UN. In particular, through a ÔsoftÕ mechanism, the international community 
might be able to by-pass the difficulties encountered in the Security CouncilÕs decision-
making process, providing a new way of dealing with international conflicts.  
 The Ukrainian situation could be a good starting point for the UN system to use a 
new method of work for achieving the goals of international peace and security. Indeed, 
these two purposes are common to the UN system as a whole, including the Security 
Council and the General Assembly. In this regard, first of all, the deployment of UN 
peacekeeping forces in Eastern Ukraine by the General Assembly will be an important step 
towards a renovation of the UN framework, in terms of working methods and ways of 
authorizing peacekeeping missions.186 Many have underlined the necessity to reform the 
UN system, especially regarding peacekeeping, but the oppositions are still numerous.187 In 
this sense, this author argues that the involvement of the General Assembly in authorizing 
peacekeeping operations in Eastern Ukraine would open the path for a more efficient and 
effective system within the UN. Moreover, it would be a good occasion to establish a 
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synergetic mechanism involving the Security Council and the General Assembly, in order 
to have cooperation and to avoid conflicts between the two organs.188 In this sense, the 
principles expressed by the ICJ in the Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion would find a 
concrete implementation. As it has been pointed out, this will ensure the Ôcomplementarity 
role of the General Assembly in peace managementÕ189 and it will give new capabilities to 
the UN system, despite the opposing internal pressures of powerful states.  
 In the words of the late UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjld: Ôthe pursuit of 
peace and progress, with its trials and its errors, its successes and its setbacks, can never be 
relaxed and never abandonedÕ.190 This is exactly what a UN peacekeeping operation in 
Eastern Ukraine is about, and what the involvement of the UN General Assembly in the 
deployment of peacekeeping forces would seek to achieve, now and in the future. 
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